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The United Kingdom and European Union 
Labor Policy: Inevitable Participation and 
the Social Chapter Opportunity 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 12, 1996, the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities (the "ECJ" or the "Court") issued its opinion in United King-
dom v. EU Counci~ thereby rejecting the United Kingdom's (the "UK") 
vehement objections to the legality of Council Directive 93/104, better 
known as the Working Time Directive.1 The Court held that the Work-
ing Time Directive, which regulates maximum working hours, rest 
periods, and night and shift work, was sufficiently related to the "health 
and safety of workers" so as to be appropriately based upon Article 
l1Sa of the Treaty of Rome.2 By so holding, the Court served notice 
to the European Union (the "EU") that it will interpret Article l1Sa 
expansively, enabling the Council of Ministers (the "Council") to leg-
islate with a majority of votes in a broader area of social policy than 
many, including the UK, had anticipated.3 The Court's decision effec-
tively weakened the British opt-out of the Social Protocol and served 
as a sharp reminder to the traditionally reluctant UK that the Council 
retains significant authority to enact labor legislation applicable to the 
entire EU.4 
Part I of this note will discuss the UK's unique position in the EU 
and the relationship it has maintained with its European counterparts, 
marked by ideological differences with respect to social, and more 
specifically, labor legislation. This uneasy relationship was emphasized 
by the UK's unprecedented decision to opt-out of the Social Protocol 
in 1992. Part II of this note will highlight the provisions of the Working 
Time Directive and the UK's unsuccessful attempt to invalidate it. Part 
II will also examine the significant effects of the Court's decision to 
uphold the legislation, most importantly the erosion of the British 
1 See Case C-84/94, United Kingdom v. Council, 3 C.M.L.R. 671 (1996); European Council 
Directive 93/lO4, 1993 OJ. (307/18) (hereinafter "Working Time Directive"). 
2 See United Kingdom, 3 C.M.L.R. at 717. 
! See Donald C. Dowling, Jr., International Employment, 31 INT'L LAW. 421, 423 (1997). 
4 See id. 
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opt-out secured four years earlier and the creation of new momentum 
in the continental push for social reform. Part III of this note will 
discuss the innovative role granted the social partners by the Social 
Protocol and will encourage the UK to take advantage of this oppor-
tunity. To do so would allow the UK to utilize its long held preference 
for workplace negotiation over government intervention while playing 
an active role in the creation of EU labor policy. 
1. THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND 
SOCIAL LEGISLATION 
A. European Community 
The European Economic Community (the "EEC") was formed by six 
nations-Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Neth-
erlands-in 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome.5 The stated 
intent of these "Member States" was to create a common market and 
to "promote through Community a harmonious development of eco-
nomic activities."6 Although some basic provisions regarding social 
protection were included in the document, the original members' 
motivation for integration was unequivocally economic.7 
Despite impressive fanfare in 1957, no concrete agenda for the 
actual creation of a unified European market was promoted until the 
publication of the European Commission's (the "Commission") White 
Paper in 1985.8 The "Single Market Program" advocated by the White 
Paper established as its primary objective the elimination of the three 
barriers the Commission perceived to be dividing the Member States: 
physical barriers, technical barriers and fiscal barriers.9 Although the 
White Paper indicated the importance of a "social Europe," it was 
5 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,1957,298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
The European Community presently consists of fifteen Member States, as Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have joined the 
original six members. See id. 
6 See Joshua M. Henderson, The Institutional and Normative Significance of the European Union's 
Acquired Rights Directive, 29 GEO. WASH.]. INT'L L. & ECON. 803, 804 (1996). 
7 See Beth L. Roberts, The Impact of the Maastricht Summit on the European Community Social 
Policy: A Breakthrough for Worker Participation or the Creation of a Two-Speed Europe?, 28 TEx. INT'L 
LJ. 357, 366 (1993). 
8 See Donald C. Dowling, Jr., From the Social Charter to the Social Action Program 1995-1997: 
European Union Empluyment Law Comes Alive, 29 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 43, 50 (1996). 
9 See id. 
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absent any plans to address social barriers, including marked differ-
ences in employment and labor standards among the Member States.lO 
The 1986 Single European Act (the "SEA") raised the White Paper's 
Single Market Program to the functional equivalent of European con-
stitutional law.u Like the White Paper, the SEA largely ignored the 
existing differences in social and labor standards among the Member 
States. 12 The SEA, however, did revise the Treaty of Rome in two 
significant aspects important to this discussion. 13 It amended Article 
100 of the Treaty so that only by a unanimous vote can the Council 
enact harmonizing legislation in areas which directly affect the estab-
lishment and functioning of the common market. 14 The SEA also 
inserted Article 118a into the Treaty, granting the Council the power 
to pass legislation designed to encourage improvements in the working 
environment, particularly legislation concerning the health and safety 
ofworkers. 15 Unlike Article 100, however, legislation enacted pursuant 
to Article 118a does not require unanimity; the Council can enact 
legislation with only a majority of votes.16 This difference would prove 
critical with respect to the Working Time Directive. 
B. United Kingdom as Member 
The UKjoined the EEC on January 1, 1973.17 Since its admission, 
the UK has had an uneasy relationship with the other Member States 
because of its resistance to complete integration. IS This resistance is 
most apparent in the UK's consistent refusal to join the other Member 
States in the development of any substantive labor policy.19 
10 See id. at 44-45, 50. France, Germany and Denmark are renowned for high levels of employee 
protection and worker-friendly atmospheres. See id. 
11 See id. at 50; Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, OJ. (L 169) (1987) [hereinafter SEA]. 
12 See Dowling, supra note 8, at 50. Dowling asserts that the advocates of social harmonization 
intentionally did not press their objectives in the early stages of the Single Market Program for 
fear that such pressure would alienate both Britain's and Europe's business communities, two 
essential players in the success of the program. See id. at 51. 
U See Susan L. Belgrave. All Wo1k and No Play?, 140 SOLIC. J. 1192, 1192 (1996). 
14 See id.; SEA, supra note 11. 
15 See SEA. supra note 11. 
16 See id. 
17 See European Communities Act, 1972. ch. 68 (Eng.) 
18 See Henderson, supra note 6, at 806. Henderson partly attributes this reluctance to Britain's 
desire to preserve its diminishing influence over world affairs and to an island geography that 
breeds isolationism. See id. 
19 See Brian Bercusson, The Conceptualization o/European Labour Law, 24 INDUS. LJ. 3, 4 (1995). 
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With the election of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government 
in 1979, EU legislation in the social field was significantly curtailed in 
the face of the UK's rejection of almost all proposals from the Com-
mission.20 This rejection of a large majority of proposals led one ob-
server to describe the development of labor norms as "spasmodic, 
episodic and unsystematic. "21 
The British reluctance to support the development of EU labor law 
is based upon a fundamental difference in ideology between Great 
Britain and many of its continental counterparts.22 Historically, the 
prime purpose of labor legislation in the UK has been merely to 
maintain countervailing power in the labor market.23 Unlike most of 
the other Member States, which created substantive labor legislation 
granting protections and benefits directly to the individual worker, 
British labor legislation instead stressed procedure; it aimed at protect-
ing the channels by which employees can collectively fight for and 
obtain the desired benefits and protections.24 This non-substantive 
approach towards labor policy was based upon an implicit recognition 
by both management and labor that due to the need for mutual 
survival, neither side would press intolerable claims during workplace 
negotiations.25 
This difference in ideology led to continuing confrontations be-
tween the UK and the majority of Member States during the first half 
of this decade.26 The UK, led by Prime Minister John Major, consis-
tently advocated a low wage strategy, at heart an "economy now, ben-
efits later" scheme.27 The UK contended that, initially, the EU should 
20 See id.; see also ROBERT E. KEOHANE & STANLEY HOFFMAN, THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
53 (1991). 
21 Bercusson, supra note 19, at 4-5; see also Angela Broughton, et al., International Employment, 
32 INT'L LAw. 303, 303-04 (1998). The Thatcher and Major governments championed the 
position that employment issues were not "properly a part of the E.U.'s 'competence.'" 
Broughton, et al., supra. 
22 See Bob Hepple, The Future o/Labour Law, 24 INDUS. LJ. 303, 313-14 (1995). Whereas many 
of the continental Member States turned to varieties of socialism and governmental interventions 
to address the inequality of the employment relationship, the British answer to the problem lay 
in "Labourism," by which organizational rights of the workers won by employees through indus-
trial struggle are defended on a pragmatic basis using law only when voluntary means are 
inadequate. See id. 
23 See id. at 315. Theoretically, this countervailing power assures equality of position between 
employers and collective organizations of workers, while leaving ample room for the continuing 
effects of market forces. See id. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See Roberts, supra note 7, at 369. 
27Id. 
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relieve its businesses of any social legislation that might affect their 
ability to compete on the international scene.28 The resultant healthy 
market would in turn provide significant employment growth, demand 
for workers, and increased general prosperity.29 Ultimately, this de-
mand for workers would create a climate in which improvements 
regarding social and working conditions could be collectively negoti-
ated by the employees, presumably at the workplace level. 30 
The majority of the Member States, on the other hand, maintained 
that Europe could not compete in a low wage contest with the likes of 
South America and Asia.lIl They contended that the EU would be better 
served by pursuing a "high-productivity" strategy.!!2 This strategy was 
based on the idea that improved technology, training, and innovation 
would provide the EU with the products and the manufacturing proc-
esses necessary to succeed at the international level, while at the same 
time allowing it to maintain higher labor standards.!!!! In turn, higher 
paid workers would not only create more consumers for the products, 
but also better educated employees more capable of attracting North 
American investment. Thus, the large majority of Member States were 
convinced that labor legislation should be developed to ensure a flex-
ible, well-informed workforce.34 This basic disagreement concerning 
the appropriate direction of labor policy provided the subject of one 
of the most extreme examples of British resistance to the EU. 
C. Maastricht and the Social Protocol 
1. The Social Chapter 
In 1990-91, the Commission, consisting of representatives of the 
thirteen Member States, rewrote the Treaty of Rome, thereby creating 
the Treaty of European Union ("TEU").lI5 This revision was largely 
viewed as an effort to take the next step beyond the Single Market 
28 See id. at 369, 384. In the words of then British Prime Minister John Major, "[a]voiding 
burdens for British businesses and British jobs is at the top of the Government's agenda.· DTI 
Press Release P/69/849, Nov. 12, 1996. 
29 See Roberts, supra note 7, at 369, 384. 
50 See id. 
51 See Roberts, supra note 7, at 384. 
52 See id. 
~See id. 
MSee id. 
55 See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 224) 2 (1992) [hereinafter TEU]; 
Dowling, supra note 8, at 53. 
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Program and to create a more cohesive Europe through political and 
economic integration.36 The Council held an intergovernmental con-
ference at Maastricht in November 1991, during which the heads of 
state of the Member States were expected to conclude discussions and 
sign the revised treaty.37 One of the most prominent features of the 
new TEU was the "Social Chapter," an article designed to propel 
employment policies, among other social issues, to the forefront of 
future Community legislation.38 
The Social Chapter set forth three key objectives previously beyond 
the scope of EU legislation.39 First, the Council would be given the 
power to enact, by majority vote, minimum requirements dealing with 
improvements in several areas: working environment and conditions; 
information and consultation of workers; equality between the sexes 
with regard to employment opportunities and treatment; and integra-
tion of individuals traditionally excluded from the labor market.40 
Second, the Social Chapter granted unprecedented legislative power 
to the so-called "social partners. "41 The social partners are recognized 
pan-European lobbying associations representing employers and labor 
at the Community leve1.42 Discussed in detail below, the Social Chapter 
permitted the social partners to jointly recommend changes to a Coun-
cil provision or to enter into a collective agreement, thereby pre-empt-
ing the proposed Council provision.43 
Finally, the Social Chapter sought to ensure that the principle of 
equal pay for male and female workers was applied uniformly.44 This 
means that the pay for the same work must be calculated on the basis 
of the same unit of measurement regardless of the worker's gender, 
and that hourly rates for the same job should be identical.45 
~6 See Dowling, supra note 8, at 53. 
~7 See id. at 54 
~B See Protocol on Social Policy, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 357 [hereinafter Social Protocol). The 
Social Protocol maintains unanimous voting on other issues regarding employment including 
social security, termination of employment contract, and representation and collective defense 
of workers. See id; see also Dowling, supra note 8, at 53-54. 
~9 See Dowling, supra note 8, at 54. 
40 See Social Protocol, supra note 38, arts. 2(1), (2). 
41 See id. arts. 2(4), 3; Dowling, supra note 8, at 55. 
42 See Dowling, supra note 8, at 55. 
4~ See Social Protocol, supra note 38, art. 4. 
44 See id. art. 6. 
45 See id. 
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2. The UK Opt-Out 
Prime Minister Major arrived at Maastricht unwilling to accept the 
revised Treaty of Rome solely because of the inclusion of the Social 
Chapter.46 Consistent with its history within the EU, the UK was the 
only Member State which refused to support the Social Chapter.47 
Major feared that the UK would forfeit two of its perceived advantages 
over the rest of Europe: liberal labor laws and lower wages.48 He instead 
advocated postponing any social and labor legislation until after the 
Single Market was firmly established.49 
Thoroughly frustrated by the UK's continued inflexibility on labor 
and employment reform, the other eleven Member States and the UK 
came to an unprecedented compromise.50 Called an "opt-out" by the 
UK, the Member States agreed to remove the Social Chapter from the 
text of the 1992 Treaty and annex it at the end, thereby creating the 
Social ProtocoJ.51 The result of this compromise was a two tiered ap-
proach to EU employment policy.52 The Council could still pass em-
ployment legislation pursuant to Article 100 of the TEU if it achieved 
unanimity. 53 If it could not, the other eleven Member States could 
regulate a wide variety of European employment policies pursuant to 
the Social Protocol, which would be held inapplicable to the UK.54 It 
was through the Social Protocol that the UK argued the Working Time 
Directive should have been properly enacted. 55 
II. THE WORKING TIME DIRECTIVE 
A. The Directive and UK Objections 
The Working Time Directive (the "Directive") was passed on Novem-
ber 23, 1993, on the basis of Article 1I8a, the recent addition to the 
46 See Dowling, sufrra note 8, at 54. 
47 See Roberts, sufrra note 7, at 369. 
48 See id. at 385. 
49 See id. at 369. 
50 See Dowling, sUfrra note 8, at 54. 
51 See id. It is because of its position annexed to the TEU that it is now referred to as the Social 
Protocol. See id. 
52 See id. at 55. 
53 See TEU, sUfrra note 35, art. 100. 
54 See Social Protocol, sUfrra note 38, preamble. 
55 See Case C-84/94, United Kingdom v. Council, 3 C.M.L.R. 671, 709 (1996); see also Belgrave, 
sufrra note 13, at 1192. 
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Treaty providing for worker health and safety legislation. 56 The Direc-
tive was approved by a majority of votes in the Council, with the UK 
abstaining from the vote.57 
The Directive requires every worker to be given a minimum daily 
rest period of eleven consecutive hours per 24-hour period and a rest 
break when the working day is longer than six hours.58 It also requires 
that for every seven-day work period, the employee be entitled to a 
minimum uninterrupted rest period of at least 24 hours, this period 
preferably being Sunday.59 It restricts the average employee working 
week to 48 hours, while requiring paid annual leave of at least four 
weeks.60 Finally, the Directive regulates the amount and patterns of shift 
and night work, taking into account the special hazards to health 
caused by extensive work under these conditions.61 
The Council, however, attempted to leave room for the Member 
State or employer to negotiate.62 Employees can work more than the 
48-hour week if they agree to do so, but may not be punished if they 
do not so agree. 53 Likewise, the Member State has the option ofrequir-
ing only three weeks of paid vacation for a transitional period of three 
years. 64 
This discretion was small consolation for the UK, which never envi-
sioned Article 118a, relating to health and safety of workers, to be used 
in such a broad manner by the Counci1.65 In fact, the British had felt 
56 See Working Time Directive, supra note 1, preamble. Article 1I8a of the TEU reads in relevant 
part: 
(1) Member States shall pay particular attention to encouraging improvements, espe-
cially in the working environment, as regards the health and safety of workers, and shall 
set as their objective the harmonisation of conditions in this area, while maintaining the 
improvements made. 
(2) In order to achieve the objective laid down in the first paragraph, the Council, acting 
in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189c and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt by means of directive, minimum require-
ments for gradual implementation .... Such directives shall avoid imposing administra-
tive, financial and legal constraints ... of small and medium sized undertakings. 
See TEU, supra note 35, art. U8a. 
57 See Catherine Barnard, A Hard Day's W07k, 56 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 43 (1997). 
58 See Working Time Directive, supra note 1, arts. 3, 4. 
59 See id. art. 5 
60 See id. arts. 6, 7. 
61 See id. arts. 8-13. 
62 See id. art. 18. 
63 See Working Time Directive, supra note 1, art. 18. 
64 See id. 
65 See Barry Fitzpatrick, Straining the Dejinitirm of Health and Safety?, 26 INDUS. LJ. 115, 118 
(1997). 
1999] LABOR POLICY 237 
particularly insulated from significant legislation on the basis of Article 
1I8a because it viewed its existing system of worker health and safety 
law to be superior to those of the other Member States.66 Instead of 
legislation designed to improve worker health and safety, the Directive 
was viewed suspiciously by the British as the typical continental re-
sponse to tough economic times and unemployment: to spread around 
existing work by forcing employers to cap hours.67 
The Conservative government immediately turned to the ECJ to 
invalidate the Directive. Although the UK challenged the Directive on 
several grounds, including inadequate or defective reasoning and a 
failure to comply with the principle of subsidiarity, the primary argu-
ment asserted by the British government was that the objectives of the 
Directive were beyond the scope of Article 1I8a.68 The UK contended 
that the regulations did not have a genuine and objective link to 
worker health and safety and that ''working environment" as provided 
in Article 1I8a concerned only the physical conditions and risks at the 
workplace. 69 This interpretation has been described as the "hard hat" 
approach.70 The UK felt an employee'S working and vacation times are 
too tenuously linked to physical risks and conditions at the workplace 
to support legislation.71 It asserted that the Directive was, at its core, 
social legislation and thus more appropriately based on Article IOO, 
the Treaty article conferring the authority to enact this type of social 
legislation, and requiring unanimous approval in the Council. 72 
B. The ECl Decision 
The ECJ overwhelmingly rejected the UK's objections and upheld 
the Directive in United Kingdom v. EU Council.73 The Court first inter-
preted the scope of Article 1I8a, and then determined that the Direc-
66 See id. at 118-19. 
67 See Dowling, supra note 8, at 57. 
68 See Belgrave, supra note 13, at 1192; Case C-84/94, United Kingdom v. Council, 3 C.M.L.R. 
671 (1996). The principle of subsidiarity permits Community legislation in areas in which 
competence is shared only if the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the individual Member States. See United Kingdom, 3 C.M.L.R. at 714. 
69 See United Kingdom, 3 C.M.L.R. at 710, 713-14. 
70 Fitzpatrick, supra note 65, at 119--20. 
71 See United Kingdom, 3 C.M.L.R. at 713-14. 
72 See TEU, supra note 35. Article 100 provides that the Council shall act unanimously to enact 
"laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affects the estab-
lishment or functioning of the common market." [d. at art. 100. 
73 See United Kingdom, 3 C.M.L.R. at 723. 
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tive fell within the scope.74 Ultimately, it found Article llSa to be the 
appropriate basis for legislation where the primary objective of the 
measure in question is to protect the health and safety of workers.75 
This is true despite any ancillary effects the legislation may have on 
the establishment and functioning of the internal market.76 
Necessarily, the Court dismissed the UK's restrictive interpretation 
of the term "health."77 It instead defined health consistent with the 
preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organisation, an 
organization to which all the Member States belong.78 Health is there 
identified as "a state of complete, physical, mental and social well-being 
that does not consist only in the absence of illness or infirmity. "79 Thus, 
Article llSa embraced "all factors, physical or otherwise, capable of 
affecting the health and safety of the worker in his working environ-
ment, including in particular certain aspects of the organisation of 
working time. "80 
Guided by this expansive interpretation of Article lISa, it was not 
difficult for the Court to find that the principal aim of the Directive 
was to protect the health and safety of workers.81 Significantly, the 
Court relied almost exclusively upon the Directive's stated objectives 
in determining purpose, rather than looking at more objective factors 
and external evidence.82 It held that where the primary aim of the 
74 See Barnard, supra note 57, at 43. The author asserts that the Court's decision should come 
as no surprise because it, in fact, set out to prove that Article 118a was the correct legal basis. See 
id. at 45. According to the author, at no point did the court take a step back and consider what 
would have been the most appropriate basis starting afresh. See id. 
75 See United Kingdom, 3 C.M.L.R at 716. 
76 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 65, at 122. 
77 See id. at 118-19; United Kingdom, 3 C.M.L.R. at 710. 
78 See United Kingdom, 3 C.M.L.R at 71 0-1 I. 
79 See id. at 71 I. 
80 See id. at 710; see also Opinion of Advocate General Leger, United Kingdom v. Council, 3 
C.M.L.R 671, 684-85 (1997) [hereinafter "Leger Opinion"J. The Advocate General in his advi-
sory opinion interpreted working environment and Article 118a even more expansively. See Leger 
Opinion, supra. According to its Danish origins, working environment ("arbejdsmilj0") includes 
non-traditional measures, including working hours, psychological factors, and training in hygiene. 
See id. It is meant to reflect the social and technical evolution of society. See id. 
81 See United Kingdom, 3 C.M.L.R at 716. 
82 See id. at 713. The Court gave considerable weight to the Directive's stated intentions of 
improving safety, hygiene, and health and of not subordinating health and safety factors to purely 
economic considerations. See id. At least one commentator argues that the biased view of the 
Commission reflected in the preamble should not be relevant if the choice of Treaty basis must 
be based on objective factors. See Barnard, supra note 57, at 45. 
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measure came within the scope of Article 1I8a, any ancillary effects on 
the internal market did not detract from that basis in the Treaty.83 
Similarly, the Court held that the Directive's contents largely re-
mained true to its stated purpose.84 With the exception of Sunday 
being the preferred day off, the Court found that a sufficient nexus 
existed between the regulation of working hours and employee health 
and safety so as to fall within the scope of Article 1I8a.85 The Court 
then proceeded to reject the other claims raised by the UK and dis-
missed the remainder of the UK's complaint, thereby upholding the 
application of the Directive to Great Britain.86 
C. Effects of the United Kingdom Decision 
1. A Changed Relationship 
When Prime Minister Major returned from Maastricht, he heralded 
the Protocol opt-out as a victory for England and proclaimed he had 
secured a competitive advantage for British business.87 This victory 
was significantly lessened by the ECJ approval of the Directive.88 The 
Court's broad interpretation of Article 1I8a's scope and its failure to 
scrutinize the aims of the legislation significantly undermined the 
British opt-out and jeopardized the unanimity rule that the UK used 
to its advantage for years.89 
The Court's ruling, in essence, asserted the autonomy of Article 
1I8a.90 Rejecting the UK's narrow interpretation of workplace health 
and safety, the Court chose instead to take a "stress and strain" ap-
proach towards health and safety, and ultimately endorsed a broad 
scope of Article 1I8a.91 Compounding the problem of the expansive 
scope of Article 1I8a was the unwillingness of the Court to investigate 
83 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 65, at 122. 
84 See United Kingdom, 3 C.M.L.R. at 715. 
85 See id. at 714-15. The ECl chose to annul the second sentence of Article 5 which encourages 
employers to designate Sunday as the weekly rest day because the Council failed to explain why 
Sunday rest is more closely related to the health and safety of the workers than any other day of 
the week. See id. 
86 See id. at 722. 
87 See Dowling, supra note 3, at 422. 
88 See id. at 423. 
89 See Bercusson, supra note 19, at 4. 
90 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 65, at 117. 
91 See id. at 120. This broad scope is consistent with the legislation's Danish origins explained 
supra note 80. Although the Court chose not to take the same approach as the Advocate General, 
the author asserts that the result was ultimately the same. See id. 
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the aims of the legislation beyond the Council's stated in ten tions. 92 The 
clear inference from the Court's reliance upon the Directive's stated 
intentions in the United Kingdom decision is that the Court will allow 
the Council to characterize an increasing number of social employ-
ment laws as "health and safety" regulations and support them on the 
basis of Article IISa.93 
2. New Momentum 
By opposing the validity of Article lISa as the treaty basis for the 
Directive, the UK furnished the Court the opportunity to adopt a more 
generous interpretation of health and safety.94 Ironically, this interpre-
tation may be more generous than even the Commission and the 
Council contemplated when considering the legislation.95 The deci-
sion, therefore, may provide a new catalyst to a social policy movement 
that has been largely restrained by British intransigence and its Social 
Protocol opt-OUt.96 
While condemned by the UK as a means of blunting employer 
competitiveness, there were few signs of radical measures being en-
acted pursuant to the Social Protocol prior to the Court's decision.97 
At the time of this article, only two measures had been enacted through 
this channel: the Directive on European Works Councils and the Di-
rective on Parental Leave.98 Other proposals apparently in the works 
include the extension of general consultation rights to employees and 
additional legislation regarding equal employment opportunities for 
women.99 It certainly has not been the source of extensive legislation 
that many feared might return to haunt the UK by eventually exposing 
them to extensive EU labor policies they had no hand in forming. lOo 
On the contrary, the Social Protocol was invoked only grudgingly 
after a UK veto of a proposed amendment under the original TEU 
92 See Barnard, supra note 57, at 45. 
93 See Dowling, supra note 3, at 423. 
94 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 65, at 134-35. 
95 See id. 
96 See Dowling, supra note 3, at 423. 
97 See Susan L. Belgrave, A New Chapter in Social Legislation?, 141 SOLIe. J. 536, 537 (1997). 
9B See id. The European Works Councils Directive (Council Directive 94/45/EC) seeks to 
improve the right of information and consultation of employees in Community-scale undertak-
ings. See id. at 536. The Parental Leave Directive (Council Directive 96/34/EC) gives workers the 
right to take three months unpaid leave following the birth or adoption of a child. See id. at 537. 
99 See id. 
100 See Roberts, supra note 7, at 363. 
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provisions. IOI Despite the stated intentions of the other eleven Member 
States to continue along the path of social reform, they did so with 
little enthusiasm in the absence of the UK. 102 The reluctance to use the 
Social Protocol as a basis for legislation was caused in large part by the 
fear of the other Member States that imposing more stringent worker 
protection measures upon their businesses would lead to unfair com-
petitive advantages for British companies operating without such re-
straints.103 Thus, the social measures envisioned during the drafting of 
the Social Chapter were greatly inhibited because of this fear of an 
uneven playing field within the EU.104 
These concerns seem to have been largely alleviated by the United 
Kingdom decision. 105 The expansive scope granted Article 118a allows 
the Council much leeway to pass legislation by majority voting that is 
applicable to all Member States, including the UK.106 Social Affairs 
Commissioner Padraig Flynn, one of the most outspoken advocates for 
an aggressive social agenda, applauded the broad interpretation and 
promised that the decision would guide him in drafting future employ-
ment laws. 107 It seems the United Kingdom decision has brought new 
life to a social reform movement mired by consistent British intransi-
gence. IOS 
3. New Leadership 
The Labour Party advocated joining the Social Protocol well before 
the Court's decision regarding the Directive. 109 True to its word, shortly 
upon assuming control the Labour government led the way in negoti-
ating the Treaty of Amsterdam, amending the TEU and securing Brit-
ish membership in the Social Chapter. llo Although the government 
101 See Dowling, supra note 3, at 423. 
102 See Catherine Barnard, The United Kingdom, The 'Social Chapter' and the Amsterdam Treaty, 
26 INDUS. LJ. 275, 279 (1997). 
lOB See Belgrave, supra note 97, at 536. 
104 See id. at 536-37. 
105 See Dowling, supra note 3, at 423. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
109 See John Kampfner, First Steps Taken Towards Social Chapter, FIN. TIMES, May 6,1997, at 10. 
110 See Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing 
the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 OJ. (C 340) [hereinafter 
'Treaty of Amsterdam"). The Treaty is a significant step for Community involvement in employ-
ment issues as it expands the scope of permissible legislation under the majority voting system 
beyond worker health and safety to now include work conditions, worker information and 
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celebrated this involvement as extending to British workers the same 
rights enjoyed by workers throughout Europe, Prime Minister Tony 
Blair and other Labour leaders have been clear that they will not allow 
the Social Protocol to serve as an open floodgate for a wave of legisla-
tion that will hinder competitiveness of British business or the creation 
of jobs. lll In contrast, Prime Minister Blair maintains that the govern-
ment will test all future proposals by whether they promote this com-
petitiveness. ll2 
The involvement of the social partners in the legislative process as 
permitted by the Social Protocol provides the Labour government with 
the means by which to secure the support of its businesses while 
participating in labor reform. The encouraged collective representa-
tion scheme should ensure that British business maintains a voice in 
the process and is able to protect itself from excessive burdens or 
unacceptable rigidities in the labor market. 
III. SOCIAL PARTNERS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
A. Collective Bargaining in the UK 
Collective bargaining has traditionally maintained a prominent po-
sition in UK labor policy despite varied public support from World War 
II until the late 1970s.113 Termed "collective laissez-faire," the British 
government largely relied upon a voluntary system of collective bar-
gaining to regulate terms and conditions of employment without the 
use of legal mechanisms to promote, support or regulate the system.1l4 
On the other hand, the Conservative government, guided by its classi-
cal market approach to employment and labor issues, attempted to 
consultation, ''the integration of persons excluded from the labour market, • and equality between 
the sexes with respect to labor opportunity and treatment. See id. art. 118. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam was ratified by Great Britain in January, 1998. See European Communities (Amend-
ment) Act, 1998, ch. 21 (Eng.). 
III See Paul Mylrea, Britain's Blair Storms Into Europe, REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REp., May 24, 
1997, at 1; see auo Mark Rice-Oxley, UK to Sign On to EU Labor Law Pact, NAT. LJ., June 23, 
1997, atA9. 
112 See Anthony Bevins, Blair's Britain: Beckett Mooes to European Time; New Government to Sign 
Up to Social Ow,pter and Working HOUTS Directive, THE INDEP., May 5, 1997, at 7. 
115 See Paul Davies, The &presentation of WorlIers in the United Kingdum from CoUective Laissez-
Faire to Market Individualism, 15 COMPo LAB. LJ. 167, 167 (1994). 
114 See id. at 172. The government, unlike many of its European and American counterparts, 
did not extend the results of collective bargaining to unorganized sections of the particular 
industry, nor did they treat the agreement as legally enforceable. See id. at 171. 
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actively obstruct collective bargaining beginning in 1979.115 The Con-
servatives viewed collective bargaining as a potential distortion of the 
market, hindering an employer and an individual employee from strik-
ing a deal which best suited them.116 
Despite these Conservative restraints, the UK has relied almost ex-
clusively upon collective bargaining as the mechanism to represent the 
employees' collective interests. ll7 It has refused to resort to the em-
ployee-based works councils that are legally required by many of its 
European counterparts. llS For this reason, collective bargaining essen-
tially remains the only institutional means of employee representation 
at the plant and company level in the UK.ll9 One observer has gone 
so far as to say that collective bargaining constitutes "the one effective 
method presently in place in the British labor arena for giving practical 
expression to the notion of industrial democracy. "120 With the entrance 
into power of the Labour party, it is reasonable to believe that govern-
ment support of collective bargaining will only increase. l2l 
B. The Roll; of the Social Partners in the Social Protocol 
Borrowing from this collective bargaining scheme, the Social Proto-
col's most innovative aspect is the opportunity it creates for repre-
sentatives of management and labor, the social partners, to actively 
participate in employment legislation.122 Although the idea of manage-
ment and labor being involved in EU action is not a new one, the actual 
authority granted the social partners to legislate in a formalized struc-
ture is unprecedented.123 Opportunity for participation by the social 
115 See id. at 167-68, 172-73. The Conservative government passed what has been described as 
"negative law' to rein in collective bargaining. See id. at 173. It imposed restrictions on the legal 
freedom of trade unions and the ability to organize. See id. It also privatized and separated public 
sector business, thus allowing the new private managers of individual units to depart entirely from 
applicable collectively agreed norms. See id. at 174-75. 
116 See id. at 168. 
m See id. at 169. 
118 See Hepple, supra note 22, at 307-08. 
119 See Davies, supra note 113, at 169. 
120 See id. at 170. 
121 See generally Davies, supra note 113; Broughton, et al., supra note 21, at 304. 
122 See Dowling, supra note 8, at 55. 
123 See id.; see also Marc H. Klein, The Single European Act and Social Dumping: A New Appeal 
for Multinational CoUective Bu:rgaining, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 411, 412. Although the Single 
European Act of 1986 indicated the Commission's desire to facilitate collective bargaining 
through Article 118(b), the provision itself was so vague as to have very little impact in establishing 
a dialogue between trade unions and multinational corporations. See Klein, supra, at 412. 
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partners is maintained and encouraged at two distinct levels: in the 
development of EU law through multi-national negotiation, and also 
at the national level by allowing domestic social partners to implement 
Council directives through collective agreement.124 
At the international level, the Social Protocol requires that the Com-
mission consult the relevant management and labor representatives, in 
effect to test the waters before taking any steps beyond basic overtures 
for legislation.125 If, after this consultation, the Commission still deems 
legislative action appropriate then it must again consult with the social 
partners on the actual content of the envisioned proposal.126 
It is at this point in the legislative process that the social partners 
have been given unprecedented authority.127 The social partners have 
the option of either (a) forwarding to the Commission an opinion or 
recommendation regarding the proposal or (b) informing the Com-
mission of their desire to initiate the process of negotiating amongst 
themselves in the particular area.128 In the event of the latter, the 
international level social partners are permitted a minimum nine-
month period in which to reach agreement.129 
If an agreement is reached between the social partners, Article 4(2) 
of the Social Protocol mandates that it "shall be implemented ... in 
accordance with the procedures and practices specific to management 
124 See Brian Bercusson, The Dynamic of European Labour Law after Maastricht, 23 INDUS. LJ. 
1, 18--19,22-24 (1994). 
125 See Social Protocol, supra note 38, art. 3(2). Article 3(2) provides that in order to facilitate 
dialogue between social partners, "before submitting proposals in the social policy field, the 
Commission shall consult management and labour on the possible direction of Community 
action." [d. 
126 See id. art. 3(3). 
127 See Dowling, supra note 8, at 55. Bercusson points out that "content of the envisaged 
proposal" is both ambiguous and critical to the negotiations between the social partners. See 
Bercusson, supra note 124, at 20-21. Described as "bargaining in the shadow ofiaw," if the parties 
already know the scope and extent of the intended legislation then there may be less of an 
incentive for a party to negotiate if it is content with the proposed legislation. See id. If the parties 
only are told the possible direction of the legislation, there will be more pressure on the parties 
to negotiate and agree in order to avoid an imposed standard that may be unsatisfactory. See id. 
128 See Social Protocol, supra note 38. Article 3(3) and (4) read in pertinent part: 
[d. 
3. [T] he Commission ... shall consult with management and labor on the content of 
the envisaged proposal. Management and labour shall forward ... an opinion or, where 
appropriate, a recommendation. 
4. [M]anagement and labour may inform the Commission of their wish to initiate the 
process provided for in Article 4 .... 
129 See id. art. 3(4). 
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and labour and the Member States .... "130 Significantly, there is no 
mention of voting requirements of the Member States with respect to 
the agreements reached. 131 A straightforward reading of Article 4(2) 
thus suggests a competence of the social partners to legislate in a 
distinct and far less restrictive form than the requirement of majority 
or unanimous voting required for Council decisions.132 If this is true, 
an agreement reached between the social partners at the international 
level effectively becomes EU law.133 
At the national level, the Social Protocol authorizes the domestic 
social partners to implement the EU directives directly through collec-
tive agreements and independently of State measures. 134 Article 2(4) 
of the Social Protocol reads "[a] Member State may entrust manage-
ment and labour, at their joint request, with the implementation of 
directives. "135 Although the approval of the Member State is required 
to delegate this authority, the provision presumably allows the repre-
sentatives of management and labor to choose the levels of collective 
bargaining and the actual participants involved that representatives 
determine most appropriate and advantageous for the implementa-
tion.136 This provision also could potentially allow the domestic social 
partners to avoid state regulation altogether by substituting a collective 
agreement, with the only guideline being that the agreement promotes 
the results imposed by the Directive.137 
C. UK and the Social Partners 
The survival of collective bargaining in the UK despite the Conser-
vative government's sustained attack emphasizes the importance of the 
process to both management and organized labor in the British labor 
system.13S For the employer, collective bargaining provides a force of 
stability in setting wages and terms of employment. 139 It can also reduce 
many of the costs associated with non-union bargaining, including the 
I~ See id. art. 4(2). 
m See Bercusson, supra note 124, at 25. 
132 See id. at 25-26. 
mSeeid. 
1M See id. at 16. 
135 See Social Protocol, supra note 38, art. 2(4). 
135 See Bercusson, supra note 124, at 17-18. 
137 See id. at 18. 
138 See Davies, supra note 113, at 170. 
139 See Hepple, supra note 22, at 306. 
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time and resources involved in negotiating with each individual em-
ployee.14o 
The benefits of collective bargaining for the workers are more read-
ily apparent.141 Studies demonstrate that employees covered by collec-
tive agreements are generally better off than those who are not.142 They 
enjoy advantages in pay, job security, health and safety, grievance pro-
cedures, and consultation rights. 143 
Although the British collective bargaining process has survived the 
Conservative attack, the Social Protocol may very well provide a plan 
for a better mousetrap. 144 The UK collective bargaining system is based 
primarily on an adversarial relationship, in which the union demands 
employee benefits at the expense of the employer and management 
attempts to protect the profits of the enterprise from these demands.145 
The traditional scene of the two parties sitting on opposite sides of the 
table epitomizes this attitude of a zero-sum game.146 
The decline in relative international strength of the UK during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s provided notice that this type of adversarial 
system was not the most efficient. 147 The ascension of Japan and Ger-
many in the international economic arena caused many observers to 
suggest that a more cooperative approach at the level of workplace 
negotiation may be the way of the future. 148 The cornerstone of this co-
operative approach is the recognition that employees must be treated 
loW See id. The author notes William Brown's somewhat dramatic view that if the parties fail to 
bring some degree of order to bargaining through collective representation "a myriad of leap-
frogging, emulative pay settlements will ratchet a country's economy into an inflationary spiral 
from which the only escape is through massive unemployment." [d. 
141 See id. at 306-07. 
142 See id. at 307. 
143 See id. Consultation rights usually refer to the employee's ability to gain access and influence 
key decisions about work and employment. See id. 
144 See Clyde W. Summers, Comparison of Collective Bargaining Systems: The Shaping of Plant 
Relationships and National Economic Policy, 16 COMPo LAB. LJ. 467, 477 (1995). 
145 See id. at 468. "[Wlhat any particular group gets is not just a matter of what they choose or 
want but what they can force or persuade other groups to let them have." Heppel, supra note 22, 
at 306 (quoting PHILIP ABRAMS, HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY 15 (1982». 
146 See Summers, supra note 144, at 468. 
147 See id. at 477. The widening growth in inequality of wages and earnings seen in Britain in 
comparison to other industrial nations in recent years has paralleled widening inequalities of 
influence and access by employees to key decisions about work and employment. See Hepple, 
supra note 22, at 308. 
148 See Summers, supra note 144, at 475, 477. In particular, German employers have accepted 
the notion that their employees should have some input in all decisions which affect their working 
lives and have allowed this input generally by way of the works councils. See id. at 475. 
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by management as partners in the enterprise, and not merely as sellers 
of services. 149 
As one commentator points out, law cannot compel cooperation in 
labor relations but it can send powerful messages. 150 The Social Proto-
col reflects this attitude by inviting the representatives of labor and 
management to pre-empt Council legislation by reaching agreement 
on a targeted issue.151 This system of encouraging negotiation, with the 
very real risk that failure to reach agreement will result in legislative 
activity, has been labeled "bargaining in the shadow of the law. "152 By 
creating this type of bargaining atmosphere, the pressure upon the 
British representatives to agree and to avoid an imposed standard that 
may be unfavorable seems to be increased.153 In this way, the proce-
dures established by the Social Protocol may very well encourage a 
measure of cooperation which traditional British collective bargaining 
has lacked. l54 
CONCLUSION 
The ECl's decision in United Kingdom to uphold the Directive on the 
basis of Article lISa sent an unmistakable warning to the British 
government that the opt-out of the Social Protocol it had secured at 
Maastricht would not completely shield it from EU labor reform. This 
warning came in the form of the Court's expansive interpretation of 
what constitutes workplace health and safety and its failure to examine 
the purposes of the Directive beyond the Council's stated objectives. 
The United Kingdom decision signaled to both the UK and the Council 
that it was prepared to grant a wide berth to future employment 
legislation applicable to all Member States. The decision was heralded 
by leading advocates of EU labor reform as an unprecedented oppor-
tunity to implement their more protective policies. 
Despite indicating a strong interest in participating and possibly 
leading such reform, the Labour Party and Prime Minister Blair have 
been clear that they are unwilling to accept any sweeping changes that 
may adversely affect the strength of British business. The Social Proto-
149 See id. at 477. 
150 See id. 
151 See Social Protocol, supra note 38, art. 4. 
152 See Bercusson, supra note 124, at 20-21. The effects of this bargaining environment are 
discussed supra note 127. 
153 See id. 
154 See id. at 20; Summers, supra note 144, at 477. 
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col, finally accepted by the UK with the signing of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, furnishes the UK the means to accomplish both of these 
objectives. The use of the social partner system described in the Social 
Protocol provides the UK with a unique opportunity to lead in labor 
policy reform while remaining largely faithful to the traditional British 
view of government non-intervention and preferred workplace nego-
tiation. 
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